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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant
Statement

of

American

incorporates

the Casef

including

by

reference

the Statement

herein

its

of Facts, as

encompassed therein, as set forth in its Appellant's Brief upon
Writ

of

Certiorari

to

"appellant's brief11).
Dakal

and

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

(hereinafter

This brief is submitted in response to

Diversified1s

Respondents'

Brief

(hereinafter

"respondents' brief) which is on file in with the Utah Supreme
Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In response to respondents' brief/ American submits that the
trial court's decision

is correct and is consistent with the

proper standards for inquiry in cases such as this.

While the

trial court utilized proper standardsf the Utah Court of Appeals
applied the wrong standard of review by erroneously characterizing
this case as one presented on stipulated facts.
instant

case

presented

no

dispute

of

fact,

Even if the

conflicting

or

inconsistent inferences may be drawn from undisputed facts and the
issue is not one of law but one of fact.
American agrees with Dakal and Diversified that in this casef
whether plaintiffs were bona fide purchasers for value was a legal
conclusion.

Further, based upon the inadequacy of consideration

and other factorsf respondents acquired title to the property with
actual notice of American's claim andf

therefore, respondents'

title is subject to American's equitable lien.

Finally, plaintiff

Dakal did have a duty of inquiry regarding American's claim
but did not satisfy said duty,
ARGUMENT
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT

IS CONSISTENT WITH

PROPER STANDARDS FOR INQUIRY IN CASES SUCH AS THIS AND IS
CORRECT.
I.

THE COURT OP APPEALS DID NOT APPLY THE CORRECT STANDARD
OF REVIEW FOR THIS CASE.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT BASE ITS DECISION SOLELY
UPON "STIPULATED FACTS."

American submits that Utah Court of Appeals erred by holding
in the instant action that the standard for review of a case
presented
thereon

on stipulated
as

the

facts is to treat the findings based

functional

equivalent

of

conclusions

of law.

Diversified Equities v. American Savings & Loanf 739 P.2d 1133,
1134f 1136f (Utah App. 1987).

First, in response to respondents1

brief, American

this

assets

that

case

was

not

presented

on

stipulated facts.
Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified contend that at the trial
court level this case was presented on stipulated facts (RB 2) ,
that no dispute of fact existed

(RB 1) and that the factual

setting of this case, although arduous in scope, did not bring
with

it any dispute

as to what had

occurred

(RB 3) .

Such

conceptions on the part of the Utah Court of Appeals and such
representations by Plaintiffs are simply not correct.

C e r t a i n l y t h e trial court stated that it u n d e r s t o o d that t h e
case

invnlvpil

represent

respect

heie"

iTi 4 L

At : the ti:i a ]r even counsel for Dakal i*. ' D i v e r s i f i e d did

20-21).
not

A\ H in dispute

'Yen t i i in I ,u:f •, fliat

tc

to the trial

t:I::i :i s

iikill h

i

iiiull

court

that

" ml I " o l

I IK

n

h ln

il

or the facts

..<

Iluil

ait"

with
needed

will be able to be stipulated t o . Rather p l a i n t i f f s ' counsel told
the court that "most" of the facts with regard to this matter a n d
" in o s t n

of

th€

d c c i i in e n t s

that

are

needed

w i1 1

be

ab1 e

to be

s t i p u l a t e d to (Ti -111 I. ,,'S, I'nr 5 L 1 -2 1
It is true that a l e n g t h y s t i p u l a t i o n in regard to the facts
was

read

into t h e record

importance

to

note

which

the

.

stipu 1 ated f a c t s ,
testimony

that

(beginning

would

they had testified^

have been

would

given

not

only

*•..*- i n g
witnesses (if

regarc t o d i s p u t e d f a c t s .

That i s f rather

lint a ] e i I g I: h y

have

covered

;A .'<J: »

such by submitting

witnesses

stipulation

But i t is of

deel st i p\ .\

t h a n p i: e * - * •
avoided

Tr 4 L 3) «.

statement

testified

11: :i a 3 , 11: I e p a i: t i e s

of what their

to if called.

respective

American

submits

t h a t" t. h e f a c • 1: s «:i 11 cl I 111» i e a s o r ,i b I e i n f e :i : e n c e, => t o b e d i: awi I t h e i: e f i: or
were

thus

presented

for d e t e r m i n a t i o n

a s if the case

had been

fully tried,

See C r o t t y v. Driver H a r r i s C o . , 49 N . J . S u p e r . 6 0 ,

139 A.?d I ,»«

1 ?!i (.1958)

An e x a m p l e that t h e oral s t i p u l a t i o n included s t i p u l a t i o n s a s
to c o n f l i c t i n g
w itne sse s

i i: I

t e s t i m o n y w h i c h w o u l d have been given by v a r i o u s
r e g a i :« :i

ili <:: • • ::i i s p u t e cl

f a c 1 i; =»

is

i 11 u s 11: a t e d

by

plaintiffs'

counsel

himself

wherein

in

referring

to a

$14,000

finder's fee charged by Brad Pentalute for a $60,000 purchase of
the subject property, plaintiffs' counsel in reciting part of the
stipulation to the court stated that,
American Savings & Loan would proffer that
their peoplef if called to testify, would
testify that that [Mr. Pentalute's fee] is an
abnormally high finder's fee and is an overpayment with respect to those services.
(Tr 21 L 3-6).
Regarding the conflicting testimony Mr. Pentalute would give
if he, Mr. Pentalute, had been called upon to testify, Mr. Mooney,
still

reciting

the parties' stipulation

to the court, declared

that,
Mr. Pentalute's testimony, at the time of his
deposition, and if called to testify, would be
that is his normal, within the range of his
normal and customary fee and what he charges
for putting together those types of distress
sale transactions because of the large number
that he has to review in order to find the
ones that are truly good buys, truly clean.
(Tr 21 L 7-13).

On page 3 of its respondents' brief, plaintiffs

noted that the trial court in its Memorandum Decision directed the
parties to refer to the stipulation of facts (TC 2 ) . In so doing,
the trial

court was

referring

the parties to a document

which

contained inconsistent facts.
While plaintiffs

in their brief acknowledge that the trial

court "reviewed the stipulation of facts, examined the documents
and considered the testimony of witnesses," they ignore the trial

court's own statement that i - "carefully" reviewed t , transcript
o

J **

rp

nesses

(RB 3

effort

to s 11; t„ a

)bviously

to

"•

airy

the testimony of w i t -

the trial

-

court
vn^v

parties in contrast -i
access

:onsidered f1

i.\ we

evidence received

'

went

ho great

presented

Li} the

m e o.^rt of Appeals w h i c h f although it had

the written

record,

obviously

could

not judge

the

credibility of w i t n e s s e s .
In a nonjury trial
find

it i s the trial judge's prerogative to

the f a c t s , include r-u

ldging the

weighing

realiabi] i ;

other

derived

and reasonable

inferences

evidence,

and

therefrom.

649 P 2- 3 48, 50 <U1 \ il: : ] 9 82)

Pacific R, Co
Inc.,

credibility

103 N.M. ] 48,

of witnesses/
drawing

Search

fairly

v.

Union

Sanchez v . M o l y c o r p ,

1 03 P.2d 9 2 5 , 93 0 (N.M. A p p . 1 9 8 5 ) ,

The Utah Supreme Court h a s held that on a p p e a l , it reviews
the?

e v i d k»n e o

i il i \ \ II11

i 11

f i n d i n g s . F u r t h e r , where

i n i u f. I

there

llr i v 11 r a lb I i

TT

">£*

^i

Hackett,

ta

there wa

,•

court,

-

;-. 2d 2 9 0 , 29
.?ti

—

judgment

unless

r eq u i r e

:i : e v e r s a ]

court

there
as

does

are errors
a

ma 1 t e r

DeVas v.

Tha*

>.

involved
11 a w

v.

where

.

ial

not reverse

:: • £

" -*"

Charlton

~f> * *61 * .
* -

the appellate

rourt

Search at 5 0 ; Nance v.

City of Prove
1*>

I I u • f. t i.. i !

is competent evidence to support

the findings this Court must sustain them.

Noble,

1 »I

the trial

court's

in the matter
Parker

v.

I n t e r n a t i o n a l , I n c . f 29 Utah 2d 8 7 , 505 P.2d 3 0 1 , 302 (1973).

which
Telegift

It is important to note that if a case is heard without a
jury, the trial

court has the exclusive function of appraising

credibility, determining the weight to be given to the testimony,
drawing inferences from facts established, resolving conflicts in
evidence, and reaching ultimate conclusions of fact.
Speed King Mfg. Co., 675 P.2d 1271, 1277

(Wyo. 1984).

Herman v.
Thus, in

the instant action, American submits that the trial court has the
exclusive
drawing

function

the

of

inferences

appraising
from

the

the

witness

established

credibility

facts.

and

The trial

court, and not the Court of Appeals, was in a position to observe
the witnesses, note

their

demeanor

on

the

stand, and

appraise

their credibility.
In

addition,

the

trial

court

has

greater

discretion

in

exercising its judgment as to the credibility of a witness who is
a party to the cause, from the fact of his interest, than as to
one whose interest is not involved.

89 C.J.S. 387, Trial §593.

Certainly in the instant case, the trial court should have had a
greater

discretion

than

the Court of Appeals

in exercising

its

judgment as to the credibility of Wayne Peck who, even though he
was

not

a

plaintiffs
action's

party,

was

the

principal

and

alter

ego

of

both

(Tr 59 L 13-25 TC 6) and had a great interest in this

outcome.

Thus, it cannot

be disputed

that

the trial

court had the sole opportunity to judge Mr. Peck's credibility and
to draw inferences and reasonable deductions therefrom.

In

addition

testimony

in

credibility,

to

the
the

dealing

parties'
trial

with

proffers

stipulation

court

was also

and

of

appraising

involved

in

factual issues involving notice and duty of inquiry
Brief

at

18). For

these

reasons,

inconsistent

American

witness

determining
(Appellant's

respectfully,

but

strongly, disagrees with the plaintiffs' and the Court of Appeals'
relegation of the trial court's findings of fact to conclusions of
law on the basis that
tantamount

the trial court's findings of fact were

to conclusions

of law with the stipulation of facts

being the functional equivalent of true findings of fact (RB 4 ) .
Diversified Equities v. American Savings & Loan, 739 P.2d 1133,
1136 (Utah App. 1987).
Even if, as Dakal and Diversified suggest, no dispute of fact
exists in the present action
conflicting

or

(RB 1 and 2) , American insists that

inconsistent

inferences

may

be

drawn

from

undisputed facts, and that the issue is not one of law but one of
fact.

Thomas v. Keith Hensel Optical Labs, 653 P.2d 201 (Okl.

1982); Pepco, Inc. v. Ferguson, 734 P.2d 1321 (Okl. App. 1987).
Thus

assuming,

uncontradicted

arguendo,

that

the

instant

case

consisted

of

probative facts, it is possible that conflicting

inferences could be deducted from uncontradicted probative facts.
Gonzales v. Derrington, 10 Cal.Rptr. 700, 702-703 (1961); Bonavita
v. Enriqht, 294 N.Y.S.2d 292, 294, 30 A.D.2d 1027 (1968); Lawyer
v. Boling, 71 Wis.2d 408, 238 N.W.2d 514, 517 (1976).

Further the

trial court may resolve such conflicts. Gonzales at 703.

In the case of Thomas v. Keith Hensel Optical Labs, supra,
the claimant sought workers compensation because he was injured in
a parking lot when leaving five minutes early for a lunch break.
The

trial

judge

found

that

the

injury

sustained

was

not

one

arising out of or [sic] in the course of claimant's employment.
Thomas at 202.

The order denying compensation was affirmed by an

appellate panel of the Workers' Compensation Court, but the Court
of Appeals vacated the order.

Id.

In granting certiorari and

vacating the decision of the appellate court, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court noted,
While
the
facts are
uncontroverted,
the
evidence, taken as a whole, does lead to two
equally reasonable but conflicting or inconsistent inferences.
Id_. at 203.
Importantly,
conflicting

the

or

high

Oklahoma

inconsistent

Court

inferences

notes
may

that

be

whenever

drawn

from

undisputed facts, the issue is not one of law but one of fact.
Id.
The Oklahoma

Supreme Court followed Thomas in the case of

Pepco, Inc. v. Ferguson, supra, wherein it stated that,
Ultimately, where differing conclusions or
inferences may be drawn from undisputed facts,
the question ... is one of fact for the trier
of fact ...
Pepco, Inc. at

1324.

The

Court

in Pepco also

reiterated

its

holding in Thomas by stating the following in upper case letters:

WHENEVER CONFLICTING OR INCONSISTENT INFERENCES MAY BE DRAWN FROM UNDISPUTED FACTS, THE
ISSUE IS NOT ONE OF LAW BUT ONE OF FACT.
Id. [Emphasis not mine].
The

cases

proposition

that

conclusions

of

functional

cited

by

plaintiffs

the trial
law

of

their

brief

court's findings are

with

equivalent

in

the

stipulation

true

findings

of

of

v. Brown,

respondents1
statement

380

brief

So.2d

on page

792

facts

fact"

being

can

to
the

also

be

For example in

(Ala. 1980) which

4, the parties

the

"tantamount

distinguished from the actual case at bar (RB 4 ) .
Stiles

for

is cited

submitted

in

an agreed

of facts together with answers to interrogatories and

affidavits, but

it appears

the trial

court was not

faced with

having to judge the credibility of any witnesses. Stiles at 794.
In
Spencer

their
v.

brief,

Hawkeye

Dakal

Security

and

Diversified,

Insurance

Company,

also

rely

216 N.W.2d

upon
406

(Iowa 1974) , which involved an action brought by a city for the
use

and

benefit

of

its

statutory

board

of

trustees

having

management and control of the public utilities of the city.

The

Supreme Court of Iowa noted that the facts in said case were not
disputed and because no conflicting inferences could be drawn from
the facts, it could interfere in the trial court's judgment.
of Spencer at 408.
possible
Iowa

It appears, therefore, that if it had not been

to draw no conflicting

Supreme

Court

entered below. Id.

Cite

would

not

inferences from the facts, the

have

interfered

in

the

judgment

The case of Fullerton Union High School District v. Riles,
139 Cal.App.3rd 368, 188 Cal.Rptr. 897f 906 (App. 1983) is another
case

cited

by

respondents

in

their

brief

on page

4 with

the

proposition that the trial court's findings in the instant case
are tantamount to conclusions of law with the stipulation of facts
being

a

functional

equivalent

Fullerton, the Appellate
trial

court's

of

Court

determination

of

true

stated

findings

that

facts

it

based

of

fact.

is bound
upon

In

by the

substantial

evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. The
Appellate Court therein also held squarely for the doctrine set
forth by Thomas v. Keith Hensel Optical Labs, supra, by stating
that "when different inferences may be drawn from undisputed fact,
the inference must be accepted by the appeal court.

Fullerton at

906.
In regard to the above, the case of Schroeder v. Horack, 592
S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. 1980) was also cited in plaintiffs' brief at
page 4.

Whereas in Schroeder it was noted that the case was tried

on a stipulation of facts and was not involving resolution by the
trial court of conflicting

testimony, the instant case involves

the resolution of questions of fact as well as the appraisal of
witness

credibility, all

of which were absent

in the Schroeder

case.
Plaintiffs attack American's use of the case of Dang v. Cox,
655 P.2d

568

(Utah 1982) to support

American's

claim

that

Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of review (RB 5) .

the
In

Dang the Supreme Court of Utah
is

conflicting

evidencef

the

recognized thatf

"[when]...there

[court] givets] deference

trial court as the fact finder (RB 5 ) .

Dang at 660.

paragraph, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged

to the

In the same

the advantageous

position of the trial court, vis-a-vis the trial, the parties, and
the witnesses. Id_.

Dakal and Diversified claim that no factual

disputes exist. (RB at 6 ) . As noted herein above, American claims
there is conflicting evidence in the instant action and that the
trial

court

did

have

an advantageous

position, vis-a-vis the

trial, the parties and the witnesses.
In

any

contended

event,

notwithstanding

by American,

the Utah

these

circumstances

Supreme Court

in Dang

as

did not

apply said circumstances as conditions precedent for its statement
that,
[T]his court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court or disturb the trial court's findings
of fact when they are based on substantial, competent,
and admissible evidence.
American submits that as set forth in its appellant's rief,
the

trial

court's

judgment

and

findings

of

fact

are based

on

substantial, competent, and admissible evidence. Where it is the
Utah Supreme Court's responsibility to review vidence as well as
law, the Court will not disturb findings of fact made below unless
they appear
evidence.
Rule

52(a)

to be clearly

erroneous and against

the weight of

Dang at 660; McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996 (1978).
of

the Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedures

also

states

that, "findings of factf whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses."

If the Court of Appeals'

ruling in this case is allowed to standf not only will findings of
fact based on oral and documentary evidence be set aside which are
not clearly erroneous/ but due regard shall not have been given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge witness credibility.
Also, if this Honorable Court allows the Court of Appeals" ruling
to standf it will not only emasculate the effect of Rule 52(a),
but will also totally nullify the trial court's perceptions of
witness testimony which the trial court itself conceded played a
part in rendering its decision in this case (TC 2).
II. WHETHER PLAINTIFFS WERE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE
WAS A LEGAL CONCLUSION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
American agrees with plaintiffs that plaintiffs were bona
fide purchasers for value was a legal conclusion in the instant
case

(RB 7); see

Conclusion

of

Law numbered

9 which states:

Neither of the plaintiffs, Diversified Equities, Inc.,
nor Dakal, Inc. was a bona fide purchaser of the
property.
Nowhere does American suggest that the ultimate determination
of whether a party is a bona fide purchaser is a strictly factual
determination as alleged by Dakal and Diversified on page 7 of
their respondents brief.

On page 18 of its appellant's brief,

American cited the important Utah case of Johnson v. Bell^ 666 P.2d

3 8, 310
whether

(Utah

1983) which

a purchaser

indicates

that

actual

notice

received

interests is a question of fact.
appellant's

brief, American

nation of whether

the determination of
of prior

unrecorded

Further, on the same page of its

also

acknowledged

that

the determi-

the duty of inquiry was satisfiedf

is also a

question of fact (see sources therein cited).
American

also agrees that it is possible that some of the

court's determinations
also asserts that
bona

fide

underscored
forth

the

is

a

legal

circumstance

as a conclusion

American

both law and

factf

but

defendant

the ultimate finding that plaintiffs were not

purchasers
by

combine

of

law

conclusion.
that

such

This

assertion

is

finding was only set

and not as a finding

of fact by

in the conclusions of law prepared at the trial court's

direction by American's counsel (TC 12, C/L 9 ) .
Thus,

American

agrees

whole-heartedly

with

plaintiffs'

citation of the following excerpt from the trial court's decision
and in so doing note that American has always treated as a legal
conclusion the determination of whether Dakal and Diversified were
bona fide purchasers:
In applying the foregoing legal principle enunciated by
the Utah Supreme Court to the facts and events of this
casef
the Court concludes that neither Dakal nor
Diversified was a bona fide purchaser of the property
(TC 6; RB 10).
It is important to note, however, that in the above quotation,
the

trial

court

acknowledged

its

limited

role

only

as

to

the

ultimate question of whether plaintiffs were bona fide purchasers

of the property.

Certainly, as already hereinabove stated near the

beginning of this brief, the trial court also recognized its role
as a finder of fact (Tr 4L 20-21)•
On page 13 of their brief, Dakal and Diversified assert that
the burden of proof is upon American to refute plaintiffs1 title.
Beginning on page 19, American in its Appellant's Brief Upon Writ
of Certiorari sets forth the bases of its claim that Dakal and
Diversified were not bona fide purchasers of the real property.
Thus, if Dakal and Diversified were not bona fide purchasers of the
property, plaintiffs' title has obviously been refuted.
III. PLAINTIFF DAKAL, INC. ACQUIRED TITLE TO THE PROPERTY
SUBJECT TO DEFENDANT AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION'S EQUITABLE LIEN.
A. PLAINTIFF DAKAL, INC. TOOK LEGAL TITLE TO THE PROPERTY
WITH ACTUAL NOTICE OF DEFENDANT AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION'S CLAIM.
1. Inadequacy of Consideration.
In their brief, Dakal and Diversified mention that the sale
price of the property as compared to market value is often an
important consideration in determining whether purchase was without
notice.

Plaintiffs also allege that it is the primary claim of

American in this matter (RB 14) . While the inadequacy of consideration is an important claim of the American, it is simply one of the
components of the evidence which when viewed as a whole provide
clear, persuasive and compelling support for the trial court's
finding

that

interest.

plaintiffs

did

have

actual

notice

of

American's

In the cases cited by Dakal and Diversified in their

brief, it is apparent

that

there

is no set formula

constitutes inadequate considerations.
Hickenlooper/

212 P. 523

as to what

In the case of Lawley vs.

(Utah 1923) on page 15 of their brief/

plaintiffs cite the following:
Where the contract under which the purchaser buys is
sufficient on its face to put him upon inquiry as to
what the consideration wasf or where it plainly shows
that the consideration has not been paid or performed/
he is chargeable with notice thereof.
A nominal or
grossly inadequate consideration recited in a deed is a
sufficient circumstance/ for a reasonable time after
such deed is made and recorded/ to put a purchase on
inquiry.... Lawley at 530.
In said casef the court does not set forth the formula by
which one could always determine whether or not consideration is
adequate.

The

Restatement

of

the

Law

on

Restitution

simply

indicates that the difference in value, however/ may be evidence
that

the

property

transferee
subject

had

to an

notice
equity

that

the

in favor

transferor
of another

held

the

where

the

transfer is for value although the consideration is of less value
than

the

property

transferred.

Restatement

of

Restitution/

Section 173f Comment b.
In their
their

respondents1

discussion

of

the

brief/

inadequacy

Dakal
of

and

Diversified

consideration

upon

base
the

"ratio of consideration to value necessary to impart notice of an
interest"

(RC 17) .

Lawleyy

supray

does not put a purchase on

inquiry

upon the ratio of consideration

nominal

or

grossly

inadequate

to value.

consideration

circumstance to put a purchase on inquiry.

is

a

Rather, a
sufficient

Lawley at 530.

The

case cited

by Dakal and Diversified

illustrate that the money

amount and not the proportion is the determining factor.
For example, in two of the cases cited by plaintiffs in
which the amounts were deemed so inadequate as to defeat a purchaser's claim of good faith, the inadequacies in consideration
totalled
523

approximately

S.W.2d

19

$11,800 to

[Tex. Cir. App.

$13,300

(Phillips v_. Latham,

1975]) and

Barton, 53 N.E.2d 862 (111. 19441) R.B. 17.

$76,000

(Rogers

v.

In Morris v. Wicks,

106 P. 1048 (Kan. 1910) , which is another case cited by Dakal and
Diversified on page 17 of their brief, the sum of $41 was considered inadequate and the purchaser took title with notice of a
prior claim.

In Morris, no market value was set forth, but the

consideration was given for a house and a lot.
In the two cases cited by Dakal and Diversified wherein the
paid amounts were deemed
notice, the differences

sufficient so as not to give rise to
between market

values and

the amounts

actually paid were between $1,000 and $2,000 in Noe v. Smith, 169
P. 1108

(Ok. 1917) and $375 in Owen v. Owen, 336 S.2d 782, 785

(La. 1976).
In the instant case, plaintiff Dakal paid Rydalch approximately $38,000 for the subject property.

Rydalch felt that the

property was worth approximately

(Tr 11 L 25, Tr 12 L

1-2)

thus leaving

visual

exterior

$76,000

a consideration
examination

only,

inadequacy
Wayne

of

Peck

$38,000. Upon
determined

market value of the property to be between $70,000 and

the

$75,000

(Tr 18 L 24-25, Tr 19 L 3) with the resulting consideration
inadequacies approximating between $32f000 and $37f000. Academy
Appraisal

Associates

appraised

the

property

at

$103,000

(Defendant's Ex* 39, Tr 70 L 6-7) in which instance the inadequacy of consideration would be approximately $65,000. Therefore , in the instant action, the inadequacy of consideration by
any calculation is between $38f000 and $65,000. American submits
that in line with the case cited by Dakal and Diversified (RB 17)
the sales price paid by Dakal was so inadequate as to put the
plaintiffs on notice.
2. Other Factors Affecting Notice.
In

referring

to

other

factors

affecting

notice, the

plaintiffs cite the cases of Corey v. Roberts, 25 P.2d 940 (Utah
1933) and Morris v. Blunt, 99 P. 686 (Utah 1909) (RB 19-20) and
the Salt

Lake

Garfield

& Western Railway

Company v. Allied

Materials Company, 291 P.2d 883 (Utah 1955) (RB 22-23) for the
proposition

that more

than a vague

reference

to a possible

interest is necessary to impart notice of a claim, but rather, a
certain threshold must be met.

The identify of the source from

whom reasonable inquiry could be made must be clear.
whether

there

is more than a vague

reference

Regarding

to American's

interest in the subject property, Brad Pentelute was aware of
American's

lien

in the property, at the time the Rydalches

acquired it from M & W Enterprises (TR 16-19; Defendant's Exs.
35, 36, 38, 40).

In addition, the identity of American as the

source from whom inquiry could be made was clear.

Beginning on page 24 of their brief, respondents apply the
concept of fault on the basis of Peterson v. Carter, 359 P.2d
1055 (Utah 1961) and Townsend v. Hooper, 2 Utah 548 (1880). In so
doing, the respondents have misinterpreted Peterson in likening
it unto Townsend,
concealing

The Townsend

[an] agreement."

In

case refers to "fault
such

instancef

fault

cealing an agreement amounts to an intentional act.
been

alleged

released

in

its

the

lien,

instant

Peterson,

"failure to protect,"
mistake.

case

that

on

the

American
other

... in
in con-

Never has it
intentionally

handf

mentions

Failure to protect amounts to negligent

Peterson clearly does not represent the idea that fault

is a factor which may be used against a claiming party.
Peterson, is different from the case at bar.
the court

found

against

In Peterson,

the plaintiffs as a matter

of

equity

because the agreement the plaintiffs relied upon was found to be
a "so-called and erroneously assumed
1057.

The agreement

'vendor's lien'."

Id_. at

relied upon by the plaintiffs in Peterson

was not a bona fide lien.

In the case at bar, a valid pre-

existing lien clearly existed.
B. PLAINTIFF DAKAL, INC. DID NOT SATISFY ITS EXISTING
DUTY OF INQUIRY.
On page 28 of its respondents' brief, Dakal maintains that
facts known to it did not create a duty of inquiry.

Even the

Court of Appeals conceded that "the circumstances were suspicious
and called

for

inquiry."

Diversified

at 1137.

None of the

c ses cited by respondents in their brief detract from the trial
court's

findings

sufficient
whether

that

information

Rydalch

had

Pentelute
to

and/or

necessitate

actually

a

Peck

had

further

"satisfied"

the

more

than

inquiry

into

obligation

to

American and whether American had made a mistake
releasing its trust deed on the property (TC 7 ) .
Factors which indicate Pentelute and/or Peck had more than
sufficient

information to necessitate a further inquiry include

the following: Both Pentelute and Peck had substantial experience
and dealings with distress properties and real estate transactions in general and were aware of the approximate market value
of the property, and Pentelute was aware of American's interest
in the property at the time that Rydalches acquired the property
from M & W Enterprises through Roy Miller
Exs. 35, 36, 38, 40).

Other facts and events demonstrate that

something was amiss regarding
their

fee-simple

events

include

Rydalches

ownership
the

to Dakal

(TR 16-19; Defendant's

of

"distress"

the Rydalches' representation of
the

property.

sale

for approximately

of

the

Such

facts

property

one half

and

by

the

or less of

its

market value (Tr 11-12, 15, 10), the $14,000.00 finder's fee paid
to Pentelute by Peck compared to the purchase price paid by Dakal
of

$37,980.00

property

(Tr

from Dakal

19-21)

and

the

to Diversified

same

day

transfer

by Peck for

of

the

$60,000.00

(Tr

20-21; Plaintiffs' Exs. 2, 6 ) . All of the above, when viewed as a
whole, clearly establishes that Dakal and Diversified were not
bona fide purchasers under Utah statutory and case law (TC 8 ) .

American

acknowledges

that

Dakal's

representative

directly

communicated with American regarding the existence of American's
lien

(RB 36, Tr 18 L 15-20).

On page 13 of their respondents'

brief, Dakal and Diversified note that the overlap between the
definition of actual notice and good faith is considerable and
then cite the following:
Good faith ordinarily exists where the purchase is made
with an honest purpose; good faith is absent where
ignorance of outstanding interests is deliberate and
intentional; and it has been held that a want of caution
and diligence which an honest man of ordinary prudence
is accustomed to exercise in making purchases is, in
contemplation of law, a want of good faith. 77 Am.Jur
2d Vendor & Purchaser, Sec. 646, p. 761.
American

submits

that

in

order

to

exhibit

good

faith

by

exhibiting an honest purpose, plaintiffs or someone representing
them

should

have made American

aware

that plaintiffs

possessed

information which suggested that American had released its lien by
mistake.

Good

faith

in

Dakal's

purchase

is

absent

because

ignorance of outstanding information possessed in behalf of Dakal
was

deliberate

American.
honest

and

to

advantage of another.

of which

by

not

being

communicated

to

Further, "good faith" has been defined to consist in an

intention

(1909).

intentional

abstain

from

taking

any

unconscientious

... Cooper v. Flesner, 103 P. 1016, 1019

Thus, American asserts that any vitiating fact, the truth
might

been

ascertained

by proper

inquiry, deprives a

party of the defense of being an innocent purchaser.
8 Thompson on Real Property §4326 at p. 458 (1963).

G. Thompson,

CONCLUSION
As set forth in this reply brief and in American's earlier
appellant's brief, the Court of Appeals not only disturbed the
Findings of Fact made by the trial court which clearly was in the
best position to make said findings, but also failed to hold that
plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers of the real property.
American respectfully submits that the trial court's findings were
not erroneous, let alone

"clearly

erroneous," or against the

weight of evidence.
Based

upon

the

above

and

the

contents

of

its

earlier

appellant's brief, American respectfully submits and urges this
Honorable Court that the Court of Appeals has rendered an opinion
which conflicts with prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and
in so doing has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings that this Honorable Court should reverse
the Court of Appeals' Opinion and affirm the decision of the trial
court.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of September, 1988.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW

H. MifflfnWilirair^t^I^
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
American Savings & Loan
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Exhibit 1 ~

U.C.A. 57-1-6
U.C.A, 57-3-3
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Trial Court's Memorandum Decision
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Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law

Exhibit 4 —

Trial Court's Judgment and Order

Exhibit 5 —

Court of Appeals' Opinion (Diversified Equities
v. American Savings and Loan Association/
739 P.2d 1133 (Utah App. 1987))

OCA 57-1-6
RECORDING NECESSARY TO IMPART NOTICE - OPERATION AND EFFECT INTEREST OF PERSON NOT NAMED IN INSTRUMENT Every conveyance of real estate/ and every instrument of
writing setting forth an agreement to convey any real estate
or whereby any real estate may be affected, to operate as
notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and
certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded
in the office of the recorder of the county in which such
real estate is situated, but shall be valid and binding
between the parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons
who have had actual notice. Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein provided, recites only a nominal
consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in such instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries
or stating the terms of the trust, shall operate to charge
any third person with a notice of interest of any person
or persons not named in such instrument or the grantor or
grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser
interest as was conveyed to him by such instrument free and
clear of all claims not disclosed by the instrument or by an
instrument recorded as herein provided setting forth the
names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed
in describing the property charged with such interest.
OCA 57-3-3
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO RECORD Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall
not be recorded as provided in this title, shall be void as
against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a
valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall be first duly
recorded.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC-, a
Utah corporation, and
DAKAL, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO- C-83-2042

:

vs.

:

MARK ENGAR LISTON, et al.,
Defendants-

:
:

I-

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This matter comes before the Court on the Complaint of
plaintiffs Diversified Equities, Inc. and Dakal, Inc. (hereinafter "Diversified" and "Dakal", respectively) to quiet title
in plaintiffs to a duplex and lot (hereinafter "the property"),
more particularly described as Lot 41, Tamlee Village, located
at 7680 South 375 East, Salt Lake County, Utah.

In addition,

defendant American Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter
"American"), in plaintiffs' original action, has filed:

(1)

a Counterclaim against plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal, alleging
that plaintiffs are not bona fide purchasers of the property
and have been unjustly enriched a>t American's expense; (2) a
Cross-claim against defendant Mark Engar Liston (hereinafter

EXHIBIT 2

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES
VS. LISTON, ET AL

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

"Liston"), alleging that Liston is still liable to American
on the Note and Deed of Trust originally executed by Donald
J. and Karen Bailey, which Liston assumed when he purchased
the property from the Baileys; and (3) a Third-Party Complaint
against Third Party defendant Douglas F. Rydalch (hereinafter
"Rydalch"), alleging that Rydalch has been unjustly enriched
at American's expense.
II.

FACTS

The above-mentioned claims of the parties have arisen
from an extremely complex and lengthy scenario of facts and
events dating back to 1978.

The Court has carefully reviev/ed

the Transcript of Stipulation of Facts of April 19, 1984, agreed
to by all the parties, and has examined all of the documentary
evidence received, and considered the testimony of the witnesses.
The Court concludes that any attempt to set forth the facts
and events leading up to and necessary for the disposition of
the claims of the parties would be in most part a reiteration
of the Stipulation of Facts, and the parties should therefore

refer

to such Stipulation

when necessary.

In the

following

Conclusions of the Court, reference will be made, where
appropriate, to the particular Exhibits and pages of the Transcript of Stipulation relied upon by the Court.

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES
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CONCLUSIONS

The parties should bear in mind that a court of equity
may exercise broad discretion in framing its decrees in order
to adopt the relief granted to the circumstances of a particular
case, and such relief should be adjusted in a manner which is
just and equitable and affords protection to and finally
determines the rights and claims of all parties.

An equity

court is not bound by strict or rigid legal remedies or by the
particular pleadings setting forth the specific claims for relief
of the parties.

See, e.g., 30A C.J.S. Equity § 599, et seq.;

27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 102, et seq.
As stated succinctly by the Utah Supreme Court in Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484, 485 (Utah 1975), "A court
of equity can and should regard as done that which ought to
be done,- and similarly, it can and should regard as not having
been done that which ought not to have been done."

These state-

ments are consistent with Rule 54(c)(1), U.R.C.P., which states
in pertinent part that "every final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings."
The Court has reviewed the legal Memoranda submitted by
the parties and conducted its own research into the numerous

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES
VS. LISTON, ET AL
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legal questions presented and, with the foregoing statements
regarding its equitable powers in mind, makes the following
Conclusions concerning the rights and liabilities of all the
parties:
A.

NEITHER DAKAL NOR DIVERSIFIED WAS A
BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF THE PROPERTY

The key issue as to whether Dakal and/or Diversified
should be accorded the status of a bona fide purchaser and thus
be entitled to prevail over American's claims against the
property is whether Dakal and Diversified had "actual notice"
of American's security interest in the property which was
mistakenly released by American prior to the conveyance of the
property from Rydalch to Dakal and Dakal to Diversified.

Et

is readily apparent from Utah case law and the general weight
of authority that "actual notice", as used in conjunction with
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 and § 57-3-3 (1953 as amended) has been
interpreted to include implied or constructive notice.

The

Utah Supreme Court has expounded upon this interpretation of
"actual notice" in a long line of cases dating back prior to
statehood.

Reiterating the holding of the seminal case before

the Court in 1890, in its very recent decision of Johnson vs.
Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983), the Court defined "actual
notice" as follows:
This statute was under examination by
this Court in Toland vs. Corey, 6 Utah
392, 24 P. 190 (1890) where we held
that the "actual notice" required by
§ 57-1-6 was satisfied if a party

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES
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dealing with the land had information
of facts which would put a prudent man
upon inquiry and which, if pursued,
would lead to actual knowledge as to
the state of the title. See a similar
expression in McGarry vs. Thompson,
114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948)
[Emphasis added]
The Utah Supreme Court has further expounded upon the
nature of the "inquiry" required of a "prudent" man in order
to be a bona fide purchaser.

In McGarry vs. Thompson, 114 Utah

442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948), cited by the court in Johnson vs.
Bell, supra, the court made the following statement:
[W]hatever is notice enough to excite
attention and put the party on his guard
and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have
led. When a person has sufficient
information to lead him to a fact, he
shall be deemed conversant of it.
[Emphasis added] 201 P.2d at 293.
Additionally, in Pender vs. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283,
265 P.2d 644, 649 (1954), the court held as follows:
Moreover, the inquiry must be made at a
reliable source from which the true
state of facts will be naturally
disclosed, it is not sufficient that
the purchaser make an inquiry of a
person when he knows that it is to
such person's interest to misrepresent
or conceal the existence of the outstanding interests and that such
person does deny its existence.
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In applying the foregoing legal principles enunciated
by the Utah Supreme Court to the facts and events of this case,
the Court concludes that neither Dakal nor Diversified was a
bona fide purchaser of the property.

The Court is in substantial

agreement with the arguments of American set forth on pages
8-10 of its Memorandum of April 25, 1984.
Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal
and Wayne Peek, the President and principal executive officer
of Dakal and Diversified, in arranging the sale of the property
from Rydalch to Dakal (Tr. pp. 16-23).

The Court also concludes

that Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding the
conveyances of the property from Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal
to Diversified are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal
and Diversified (Tr. pp. 18-22; Plaintiffs' Exs. 5 & 6;
Defendants* Exs. 4 2 & 43; Norman vs. Murray First Thrift & Loan
Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979), and cases cited therein).
Consequently, in determining whether Dakal or Diversified
should be accorded bona fide purchaser status, the "actual
notice" (as defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson,
McGarry, and Pender, supra) of both Pentelute and Peck are
imputed to both Dakal and Diversified in regard to American's Trust
Deed which was mistakenly reconveyed by American.
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The Court concludes that Pentelute and/or Peck had more
than sufficient information to necessitate a further inquiry
into whether Rydalch had actually "satisfied" the obligation
to American and whether American had made a mistake in releasing
its Trust Deed on the property.

Such an inquiry would have

in all probability led to the discovery that neither the
Rydalches nor anyone else had paid American and that American's
release of its Trust Deed was in fact a mistake.

Both Pentelute

and Peck had substantial experience and dealings with distressed
properties and real estate transactions in general, both were
aware of the approximate market value of the property, and
Pentelute was aware of American's interest in the property at
the time the Rydalches acquired the property from M & W Enterprises
through Roy Miller (Tr. pp. 16-19; Defendants' Exs. 35, 36,
38, 40).
In addition, the Court finds that other facts and events
support its conclusion that Pentelute and/or Peck knew or should
have known that something was amiss regarding the Rydalches'
representation of their fee simple ownership of the property.
Such facts and events include the "distress" sale of the property
by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or less
of its market value (Tr. pp. 11-12, 15, 19), the $14,000.00
finders fee paid to Pentelute by Peck compared to the purchase
price by Dakal of $37,980.00 (Tr. pp. 19-21), and the same-day
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transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified by Peck for
$60,000.00 (Tr. pp. 20-21;

Plaintiffs' Exs. 2, 6 ) .

Therefore, the Court concludes that all of the abovementioned evidence, particularly when viewed as a whole, clearly
establishes that Dakal and Diversified were not bona fide purchasers
of the property under Utah statutory and case law.
B.

THE RYDALCHES HAVE "UNCLEAN HANDS" AND ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO FAVORABLE EQUITABLE RELIEF

Perhaps the most important and time-honored maxim of equity
is that one who comes before a court of equity with "unclean
hands" is not entitled to any benefit or favorable treatment.
Upon examining all of the evidence, this Court concludes that
the Rydalches do jiave "unclean hands" by reason of their representations of fee simple ownership of the property with no security
interest in favor of American and their conveyance of the property
without the written or oral approval of American.
The warranty deed conveying the property from M & W Enterprises
to the Rydalches expressly stated that the property was subject
to American's Trust Deed (Defendants' Ex. 38). The Buyer's
Escrow Instructions, executed by the Rydalches, also expressly
stated that the property was subject to American's Trust Deed
and also subject to the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement
requiring the written approval of American prior to any sale
or transfer of the property (Defendants' Ex. 35). The Rydalches
also executed an Indemnification and Waiver agreement for
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Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged that Stewart
Title Co., the escrow and closing agent, had informed them of
the existence of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, and that
the Rydalches would hold harmless and indemnify Stewart Title
Co. for any consequences resulting from the failure to obtain
written approval from American prior to the transfer of the
property (Defendants' Ex. 37). M & W also executed a Transfer
and Assignment of Reserve Account, which assigned and transferred
to the Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of
taxes and insurance on the property (Defendants' Ex. 36). Based
upon an appraisal of

the property by Academy Appraisal Associates

(Defendants' Ex. 39), the Rydalches received a Title Insurance
Policy from Stewart Title Co. in the amount of $103,000.00
Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy itself
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed
of Trust and Non-Assumption agreement (Defendants' Ex. 40).
The closing officer at Stewart Title Co. further indicated that
she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that the property
was subject to American's Deed of Trust.
Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew
or certainly should have known that their obligation to American
had not been paid, since they had not done so, and that American's
release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake.
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The Court therefore concludes that the Rydalches have
"unclean hands" and are not entitled to favorable equitable
relief.

It is most unfortunate and the Court empathizes with

the Rydalches that they have been the victims of an apparent
fraud perpetrated by Roy Miller through M & W Enterprises.
However, such action by Miller offers no legal or equitable
justification for the actions of the Rydalches regarding their
representations that American's interest in the property had
been satisfied and their sale of the property to Dakal.
C.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT -- THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
OF ALL THE PARTIES BEFORE THE COURT

As the Court has concluded that Dakal and Diversified
were not bona fide purchasers of the property, and in conjunctio
with the overall equitable remedy decided by the Court, infra,
it is the judgment of the Court that all transactions regarding
the transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified are
rescinded, and all rights and/or liabilities of Diversified
to the property or Dakal, respectively, are terminated.
Title to the property is quieted in Dakal, subject to
an equitable lien in favor of American for the amount of unpaid
principal and arrearages due

and owing and upon precisely the

same payment terms of principal and interest as American's origi
Trust Deed and all other terms of said Trust Deed, with the
specific exception that the sole obligor or trustor of American'
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Dakal shall have six months

to bring current all arrearages for monthly payments and any
arrearages for the reserve account to pay taxes and insurance
on the property as of the date of this Memorandum Decision.
All principal, interest and reserve account payments from such
date shall be the sole obligation of Dakal.

All rental payments

from tenants paid in escrow or due shall go to Dakal.
The Rydalches have been unjustly enriched at the expense
of Dakal in the amount of $37,980.00, the sale price of the
property.

The closing costs of the conveyance from the Rydalches

to Dakal shall remain as paid by Dakal.

The $14,000.00 finders

fee paid to Pentelute by Dakal or Peck was not part of the
sale price and any cause of action between Dakal or Peck and
Pentelute is up to those parties, as Pentelute is not a party
to these proceedings.

A Judgment by the Court is therefore

rendered against the Rydalches and in favor of Dakal for $37,980.00.
All rights and/or liabilities of the Rydalches relating to the
property are terminated.
In the opinion of the Court, Liston is the least culpable
of all the parties now before the Court.

His only liability

could arise from his transfer of the property without obtaining
the prior approval of American.

Without ruling on the legal

question of whether Liston may still be liable pursuant to the
terms of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, the Court concludes
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that it would be inequitable for Liston to remain personally
liable in view of the Court's remedy as set forth above.

Therefore,

all rights and/or liabilities of Liston relating to the property
or American's claims against Liston are terminated.
The Court also empathizes with Liston and it is most
unfortunate that he is the apparent victim of a fraud perpetrated
by Roy Miller and/or M & W Enterprises, Herb Holtzer and Shino
Corporation.

However, none of these parties is now before the

Court and Liston must pursue his own cause of action against
any of them.
All of the parties now before the Court bear some responsibility
for the events leading up to these proceedings.

Although only

mentioned briefly by the Court, the unfortunate result of the
entire chain of events would not have occurred except for the
negligent and unilateral mistake of American in releasing its
interest in the property.

It is therefore the judgment of the

Court that each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's
fees and that American is not entitled to any late fees which
have accrued as of the date of this Memorandum Decision.
Counsel for American shall prepare the necessary Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order of the Court,
including the precise amounts of all sums due and owing from
one party to another as of the date of this Memorandum Decision,
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Such documents shall be submitted

to the Court and other parties by ,inno ?n

IQQA
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah
corporation, and DAKAL, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
MARK ENGAR LISTON; ROY L. MILLER
and ELLEN GERALDINE MILLER, husband
and wife; BARBARA VIGIL; TIMOTHY
HART and GAYLE HART, husband and
wife; each idividually; and
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON, as trustee
and not individually; and AMERICAN
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah
banking corporation; BEEHIVE THRIFT
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah banking corporation; and M & W ENTERPRISES, allegedly a Utah general
partnership; and JOHN DOE NUMBERS 1
through 10 being all other persons
unknown/ claiming any right, title,
estate or interest in, or lien upon
the real property described in the
pleading adverse to the Plaintiffs1
ownership, or clouding their title
thereto,

Case N o .

C83-2042

Honorable J . Dennis
Frederick, Judge

Defendants.
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION,
PRATT.
CAHOON
• AT LAW
ZA
OHO SOUTH I

t crnr,
»4t01

I

Third-party
Plaintiff,
EXHIBIT 3

i
li

^ s .

I STEWART TITLE COMPANY and DOUGLAS
F. RYDALCH,
!
I

j

Third-party
Defendants.

THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable

j
| J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 19th
day of April, 1984, various parties to the action having been pre! viously dismissed

therefrom, and the remaining

following

parties

I being present and/or represented by their respective counsel:

For

ithe Plaintiffs, Jerome H. Mooney, Esq.; for Defendant Mark Engar
IListon, David J.

Knowlton, Esq.; for Defendant

and Third-party

j
; Plaintiff American Savings & Loan Association, H. Mifflin Williams
j III, Esq.; for Third-party Defendant Douglas R. Rydalch, Duane A.
Burnett, Esq.
The parties represented

at the hearing

having

entered

into

and presented an oral stipulation of facts, agreed to by all the
parties so represented, and said parties having

introduced

their

respective documents which were admitted into evidence, and Defendant Mark Engar Liston having presented

evidence, and the Court

having heard and examined the evidence, both oral and documentary,
introduced by the respective parties hereto, and having examined
the memoranda of counsel, and now being fully advised in the premises, makes the following:

PIHDIHGS OF PACT
1.
Plaintiff

j

On or about January 27, 1978, Defendant and Third-party
American

Savings

and

Loan

Association

(hereinafter

"American11) made a loan to Donald J, and Karen H. Bailey in the
' sum of $59,200, which loan was evidenced by a Promissory Note and
a Deed of Trust.

The Deed of Trust was dated January 27, 1978,

and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No, 3059974 at page 826
of Book 4619 in the official records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office.
2.

The real property (hereinafter "property") described in

said Deed of Trust is located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and is
more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 41, TAMLEE VILLAGE, according to the official
plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah.
•

3.

In October,

1980, the Baileys

sold

the property

to

»

, Defendant Mark Engar Liston (sometimes hereinafter "Liston") who
t

;

assumed the Baileys' loan with American upon American's approval
by executing a Mortgage Loan Assumption Agreement, a Modification
Agreement, and a Waiver of Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement.
4.

In the documentation signed by Liston when he assumed
»

the above-described loanf the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement was waived specifically and exclusively for the conveyance
from Bailey to Liston, but the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement did remain in effect as to subsequent sales.

5.

On May 14f 1982, Liston gave to M & W Enterprises a War-

ranty Deed (which was subsequently recorded) without the approval
or knowledge of American, even though the property was still subject to American's Trust Deed.
6.

On May 28, 1982, without American's knowledge or appro-

val, M & W Enterprises sold the property to Defendant Douglas F.
Rydalch

(sometimes

hereinafter

"Rydalch")

and

his

wife,

Joan

Rydalch (hereinafter referred to with Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch
as "Rydalches").
1.

The

Warranty

Deed

conveying

the

property

from

M & W

Enterprises to the Rydalches, expressly stated that the property
was subject to American's Trust Deed.
8.

The

Buyer's

Escrow

Instructions,

executed

by

the

Rydalches, also expressly stated that the property was subject to
American's

Trust

Deed

and

also

subject

to

the

Deed

of

Trust

Non-Assumption Agreement requiring the written approval of American prior to any sale or transfer of the property.
9.

The Rydalches also executed an Indemnification and Wai-

ver Agreement for Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged
that

Stewart

Title

Company,

the

escrow

and

closing

agent, had

informed them of the existence of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, and that

the Rydalches would

hold

harmless

and

indemnify

i
Stewart

Title

Company

failure

to obtain

for

written

transfer of the property.

any

consequences

approval

from

resulting

American

from

prior

to

the !
the »

10.
:

M & W Enterprises also executed a Transfer and Assign-

ment of Reserve Account which assigned and transferred

to the

Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of taxes and
insurance on the property.
11.

Based

upon an appraisal

of

the property

Appraisal Associates, the Rydalches received
policy

from Stewart Title Company

by Academy

a title insurance

in the amount of $103,000.

Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy, itself,
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed of
Trust and Non-Assumption Agreement.
12.

The closing officer at Stewart Title Company further

indicated that she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that
the property was subject to American's Deed of Trust.
13.
Deed
:

on

American mistakenly and unilaterally released its Trust
the

property

by

reconveyance

which

was

recorded

on

December 9, 1982, as Entry No. 3737849 in Book 5424, page 1731 in

| the records of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah.
j

14.

The Trust Deed in favor of American had in fact not been

«

paid and the reconveyance was erroneously given.

Said Trust Deed

i continues to be unpaid.
j
{
15. As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal
i

balance owed to American under

its Trust Deed

is the sum of

$56,742.92 and the arrearages under said Trust Deed (which total
$15,886.00) consist of principal in the sum of $1,283.60, interest
in the sua of
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$1,956.28.

$12,626.12

and

reserve

account

in the

sum of

16-

On February 17, 1983f American recorded its Affidavit as

Entry No. 3760970 in Book 5439 at page 171 in the official records
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, indicating that
the Trust Deed, described hereinabove, had been released by mistake.
17.

Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew

or certainly should have known that their obligation to American
had not been paid since they had not done so and that American's
release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake.
18.

On

Rydalches

January

sold

the

21,

1983,

subject

(sometimes hereinafter

for

property

the

sum

to

of

Plaintiff

$37,980,

the

Dakal,

Inc.

•Dakal") which on the same day, sold the

property to Plaintiff Diversified Equities, Inc. (sometimes hereinafter

"Diversified" or "Diversified

Equities") for the sum of

$60,000.
19.

Prior to the sale of the property

to Dakal, Defendant

Rydalch represented to Dakal that American1s interest in the proi perty had been satisfied.
j

20.

i Rydalches

At

the

time

of

to Dakal, Wayne

the

sale

of

the

property

Peck was the President

from

the

and

principal

Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events

regarding

executive officer of Dakal and Diversified.
21.

: the conveyances of the property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch
i
' to Dakal, Inc., and

from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified

Equities,

Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and DiverDE. P R A T T .
i & CAMOON
INCVS AT L A W
[RICAN SAVIMOS

i sified Equities.

22.

An individual by the name of Brad Pentelute arranged the

I
1 sale of the property (from the Rydalches to Dakal) in behalf of
! Dakal and Wayne Peck.
23.

Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal

»
i

1

and Wayne Peck, the President and principal executive officer of

i

I Diversified and Dakal, Inc., in arranging the sale of the property
j from Third-Party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc.
*

!

24.

Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had more than suffi-

i

cient

information

| Rydalch

had

to necessitate a further

actually

satisfied

the

inquiry

obligation

into whether

to American

and

| whether American had made a mistake in releasing its Trust Deed on
l

L

the property.

i
*
1

25.

Such an inquiry would have, in all probability, lead to

the discovery that while the Rydalches, and no one else, had the

i obligation

to

pay

American's

loan,

neither

the

Rydalches

nor

anyone else had paid American and that American fs release of its
Trust Deed was, in fact, a mistake.
26.
should

In addition, Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck knew or
have

known

that

Rydalches' representation
property.

Supporting

something
of their

was

amiss

fee simple

regarding

the

ownership of the

facts include the "distress" sale of the

property by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or
less of its market value, the $14,000 finder's fee paid to Brad
Pentelute by Wayne Peck compared to the purchase price by Dakal of
$37,980, and the same-day transfer of the property from Dakal to
fOE P R A T T
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RNCVS AT LAW
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Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000.

J
I

27.

Both

Brad

Pentelute

and

Wayne

Peck

had

substantial

j experience and dealings with distressed properties and real estate
» transactions in general, both were aware of the approximate market
value of the property and Pentelute was aware of American's interest in the property at the time the Rydalches

acquired

the pro-

perty from M & W Enterprises (Pentelute had received a copy of the
title insurance policy for the property received by the Rydalches
at the time of their purchase which showed American's lien).
28.

The property

was

sold

by

the

Rydalches

to Dakal

for

approximately one-half or less of its market value.
29.

Wayne Peck paid a finder's fee in the sum of $14,000 to

Brad Pentelute for arranging the property's purchase by Dakal.
30.

Dakal paid the closing costs of the conveyance from the

Rydalches to Dakal.
31.

Dakal is entitled to receive all rental payments in the

total sum of $325.00 from tenants of the property which have been
paid in escrow or are currently due.
|
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(

1.

Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had

more

than suffi-

i

} cient

information to necessitate

Rydalch had actually

"satisfied"

a further

inquiry

the obligation

into whether

to American

and

whether American had aade a mistake in releasing its Trust Deed on
the property.
2.

Such an inquiry would have, in all probability, lead to

the discovery that while the Rydalches, and no one else, had the
obligation to pay American's loan, neither the Rydalches nor anyone
>c P R A T T
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else had

paid

American

and

Trust Deed was in fact a mistake.

that

American's

release

of

its

;

3,

In addition,

and/or Wayne Peck

the

Court

concludes

that

Brad

knew or should have known that

Pentelute

something

was

amiss regarding the Rydalches representation of their fee simple
ownership of the property.

Supporting

facts

include

the

•dis-

tress" sale of the property by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or less of its market valuer the $14,000 finder's
fee paid to Brad Pentelute by Wayne Peck compared to the purchase
price

by

Dakal

of

$37,980,

and

the

same-day

transfer

of

the

property from Dakal to Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000,
4.

Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck had

"actual

notice" of

American's security interest in the property which was mistakenly
released by American prior to the conveyance of the property from
Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal to Diversified.
5.

Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal

and Wayne Peck, the President and principal executive officer of
I Diversified and Dakal, Inc., in arranging the sale of the property
| from Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc.
i
[

6.

Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and

events

regarding

! the conveyances of the property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch
to Dakal, Inc., and

from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified

Equities,

Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and Diversified Equities.
7.
The actual notice of both Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck
1

are imputed to both Dakal and Diversified Equities

in regard to

i

American's Trust Deed which was mistakenly
can.

reconveyed

by Ameri-

I

8,

Therefore,

Dakal

and

Diversified

Equities

had

"actual

notice" of American's security interest in the property which was
» mistakenly

released

by American

prior to the conveyance

of

the

property from Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal to Diversified Equities.
i

9.

Neither of the Plaintiffs, Diversified

Equities, Inc.,

nor Dakal, Inc., was a bona fide purchaser of the property.
10.

Thus, neither of the Plaintiffs, Diversified

Inc., nor Dakal, Inc. should

be entitled

Equities,

to prevail over Ameri-

can's claims against the property.
11.

The Rydalches either knew or certainly should have known

| that their obligation to American

had not been paid, since they

: had not done so and that American's release of its trust deed on
i the property had to be a mistake.
i

I

12.

The Rydalches have "unclean hands" by reason of

their

j representations of fee simple ownership of the property with no
security interest in favor of American and their conveyance of the
property without the written or oral approval of American.
13.

Because

one who comes

before

a court

of

equity

with

"unclean hands" is not entitled to any benefit or favorable treatment,

the

Rydalches

are

not

entitled

to

favorable,

equitable

relief.
14.
from

Dakal

and/or
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All transactions regarding the transfer of the property
to

Diversified

liabilities

of

should

Diversified

be

rescinded

Equities

Dakal, respectively, should be terminated.

to

and
the

all

rights

property

or

15.

Pursuant

to its original trust deed dated January 27,

1978, and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No. 3059974 at page
826 in Book 4619 of the official records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder in Salt

Lake County, Utah, American

is entitled

to an

j equitable lien upon the property for the amount of unpaid princi!

i pal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely the same payi
i

i ment terms as American's original trust deed (as set forth in this
! paragraph) and all other terms of said trust deed with the speci!

fie

exception

that

the

sole

obligor

or

trustor

of

American's

security interest should be Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc.
16.

Title to the property should be quieted

in Dakal, sub-

ject to an equitable lien in favor of American for the amount of
! unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely
| the same payment

terms of principal

and

interest

as

American's

i

original trust deed

(dated January 27, 1978 and recorded

in the

office of the Salt Lake County Recorder on February 2, 1978, as
Entry No. 3059974 at page 826 in Book 4619) and all other terms of
said trust deed, with the specific exception that the sole obligor
or trustor of American's security interest should be Dakal,
17.

As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal

j balance owed to American under its equitable lien is the sum of
$56,742.92 and

the arrearages

under

said

total $15,886.00) consist of principal

equitable

lien

(which

in the sum of $1,283.60,

interest in the sum of $12,626.12 and reserve account in the sum
of $1,956.28.
^LYOE. PHATT.
BBS ft CAHOON
rro«N«Ym AT LAW
AMKftlCAM OAVIN««

j

18.

Dakal should have six months from May 30r 1984, to bring

, current all arrearages for monthly payments and any arrearages for
i the reserve account (which is used to pay taxes and insurance on
:

the property).
19.

All principal interest and reserve account payments to

j American under its equitable lien should be the sole obligation of
: Dakal.
i
»

20.

All rental payments from tenants of the property paid in

escrow or currently due in the total sura of $325.00 should be paid
to Dakal.
21.
j of

Dakal

The Rydalches have been unjustly enriched at the expense
in

the

amount

of

$37,980,

the

sale

price

of

the

; property.
»

22.

The closing costs of the conveyance from the Rydalches

! to Dakal should remain as paid by Dakal.
!

23.

The $14,000 finder's fee paid to Brad Pentelute by Dakal

! or Wayne Peck was not part of the sale price of the property.
|

24.

Judgment

should

be

rendered

against

the

Third-party

Defendant Rydalch and in favor of Dakal for $37,980.
25.

All rights and/or liabilities of Third-party

Defendant

Rydalch relating to the property should be terminated.
26.

Defendant Liston is the least culpable of all the par-

ties now before the Court.
27.
may
PRATT.
CAHOON
r% A T L A W
IAN SAVINGS
fcXA
CONO SOUTH

still

Without ruling on the legal question of whether Liston
be

liable

pursuant

to

the

terms

of

American's

Non-

Assumption Agreement, it would be inequitable for Defendant Liston
f to remain personally liable to American.
|

28.

All rights and/or liabilities of Defendant Liston relat-

; ing to the property or American's claim against Liston should be
j terminated.
I

29.

All rights and/or liabilites of Defendant Liston relat-

; ing to the property or American's claim against Liston should be
» terminated.
;
;

30.

The Court concludes that because all of the parties now

before the Court bear some responsibilities for the events leading
up to these proceedings and because the result of the entire chain
of events would not have occurred except for the negligent and

J unilateral mistake of American in releasing its interest in the
! property, each party should bear its own costs and attorneys fees.
1

Also American is not entitled to any late fees which have accrued
as of May 30, 1984.
DATED this

day of July, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

71 Dennis Frederick
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 2, 1984, I personally mailed a
true and correct
LYOC. PKATT.
IBS ft CAHOON
LMCKICAN O A V I N M

Conclusions

of

copy of the foregoing

Law,

postage

prepaid,

by

Findings of
United

Fact and

States

mail,

i to the offices of the following counsel:
Jerome H.
Arthur H.
Attorneys
356 South
Salt Lake

Mooney, Esq.
Strong, Esq.
for Plaintiffs
300 East
City, UT 84111

Spencer E. Austin, Esq.
Attorney at Law
185 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
David J. Knowlton, Esq.
Attorney at Law
2910 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84402
Duane A. Burnett, Esq.
710 West 2125 South
Woods Cross, Utah 84087

oc. P R A T T .
B ft C A H O O N
IMKY9 AT LAW
C*tCAN SAVINOS
r t l C O N O SOUTH
r l A t t err*

Ted Boyer
H. Mifflin Willlans I II
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON
Attorneys for Defendant
American Savings 6 Loan Association
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:
(801) 322-2516
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah
corporation, and DAKAL, INC., a
Utah corporation.
Plaint iffs,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

vs.
MARK ENGAR LISTON? ROY L. MILLER
and ELLEN GERALDINE MILLER, husband
and wife? BARBARA VIGIL; TIMOTHY
HART and GAYLE HART, husband and
wife? each idividually? and
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON, as trustee
and not individually; and AMERICAN
SAVINGS k LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah
banking corporation
BEEHIVE THRIFT
AND LOAN ASSOCI*"IP,, a Utah banking corporation? «i.:d M & W ENTERPRISES, allegedly a Utah aeneral
partnership? and JOHN DOE NUMBERS 1
throuqh 10 being all other persons
unknown, claiming any right, title,
estate or interest in, or lien upon
the real property described in the
pleading adverse to the Plaintiffs*
ownership, or clouding their t i d e
thereto,

Case No. T83-2042
Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, Judge

Defendants.

AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION,

CLYDE

PWATT

Third-party
Plaintiff,

Gieas & CAHOON
ATTOmfitr* AT LAW
I ">0 AMCAlCAM l A V I N W
*LALA
?"» WCST I t r O N O SOUTM
SALT LA«f CITY
UTAH •4IOI

EXHIBIT 4

vs.
STEWART TITLE COMPANY and DOUGLAS
F. RYDALCH,
Third-party
Defendants.

THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 19th
day of April, 1984, various parties to the action having been previously dismissed

therefrom, and the remaining

following

parties

being present and/or represented by their respective counsel:

For

the Plaintiffs, Jerome H. Mooney, Esq.; for Defendant Mark Engar
Liston,

David J.

Knowlton,

Esq.;

for

Defendant

and

Third-party

Plaintiff American Savings & Loan Association, H. Mifflin Williams
III, Esq.; for Third-party Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch, Duane A.
Burnett, Esq.
The parties represented

at the hearing

having

entered

into

and presented an oral stipulation of facts, agreed to by all tne
parties so represented, and said parties having

introduced

their

respective documents which were admitted into evidence, and Defendant Mark Engar Liston having presented

evidence, and

the Court

having heard and examined the evidence, both oral and documentary,
introduced by the respective parties hereto, and having examined
the memoranda of counsel, and now being fully advised in the premises, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.
property

That

all

transactions

(hereinafter

regarding

"property") situated

the

transfer

of

real

in the County of Salt

Lake, State of Utah, and more particularly described

hereinbelow

from Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc., to Plaintiff, Diversified

Equities,

Inc., are rescinded, and all rights and/or liabilities of Plaintiff, Diversified

Equities,

Inc., to the property

Dakal, Inc., respectively, are terminated.

or

Plaintiff

The property

is more

particularly described as follows:
LOT 41, TAMLEE VILLAGE, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF, recorded in the office of
the Salt Lake County Recorder located in Salt
Lake County, Utah.
2.

Pursuant

to its original

trust deed

dated

January 27,

1978, and recorded as Entry No. 3059974 at page 326 in Book 4619
of the official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder

in Salt

Lake County, Utah, Defendant, American Savings & Loan Association
is the holder

of

an equitable

lien

upon

the

property

for

the

amount of unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon
precisely the same payment

terms as Defendant American Savings &

Loan's original trust deed

(as set forth

all other terms of said

trust deed

with

in this paragraph) and
the specific

exception

that the sole obligor or trustor of Defendant American Savings &
Loan's security interest shall be Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc.
3.

That Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc., owns in fee simple the real

property situated in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and

described hereinabove, subject
Defendant American

to an equitable

Savings & Loan Association

lien

in favor of

for the amount of

unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely
the same payment

terms

of

principal

and

interest

American Savings & Loan!s original trust deed

as

Defendant

(dated January 27,

1978, and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No. 3059974 at page
826 in Book 4619, of the official records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder) and all other terms of said trust deed with the specific
exception that the sole obligor or trustor of Defendant

American

Savings & Loan Association's security interest shall be Plaintiff
Dakal, Inc.
4.
balance

As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal
owed

to Defendant

American

Savings

& Loan

under its equitable lien was the sum of $56,742.92.

Association
The arrear-

ages under said equitable lien consist of principal in the sum of
3 1 ,?a?_6f)

/ interest

in the sum of

$ 19 ^

19

, and

account (for taxes and insurance) in the sum of $ 1,956.28
5.

reserve
L

That Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc., shall have six months from

May 30, 1984, to bring current all arrearages f6r monthly payments
and the reserve account.
6.

Defendant American Savings & Loan Association shall not

be entitled

to any

late

fees which

have

accrued

as of May 30,

1984.
7.

From May 30, 1984, all principal, interest and reserve

account payments to Defendant American Savings & Loan Association

under its equitable lien shall be the sole obligation of Plaintiff
Dakal, Inc.
8.

All renta} payments paid

by tenants

of the property

which have been paid in escrow or which are currently due in the
sum of $325.00 shall be paid to Dakal, Inc.
9.

Third-party

Defendant

Douglas

P.

Rydalch

has

been

unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff Dakal, Inc., in the
amount

of

$37,980

and

judgment

is

hereoy

rendered

against

Third-party Defendant Douglas Rydalch and in favor of Plaintiff
Dekal, Inc., for $37,980.
10.

That all rights and/or liabilities of Third-party Defen-

dant Douglas F. Rydalch relating to the property are hereby terminated «,
11.

That

Third-party

the closing

Defendant

costs

Rydalch

of

the conveyance

to Plaintiff

Dakal,

from the

Inc., shall

remain as heretofore paid by Plaintiff Dakal, Inc.
12.

All rights and/or liabilities of Defendant Mark Engar

Liston relating to the property are terminated and the claims of
Defendant American Savings & Loan Association against

Defendant

Liston as set fortn in Defendant American Savings fc Loan Association's Counter Claim against said Defendant are hereby dismissed
with prejudice.
13.

Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys fees
fj

incurred herein.
DATED this

^J

day of"jun>£r 198^.
BY THE/QOURT:

CLYDE PRATT
GIBBS & CAHOON
A T T O * N C V « A T «_AW

ZOa AMERICAN SAVlNOft
PLAZA
77 w t « T IfCONO SOUTH
SALT LAKI CITY
UTAH •4IO«

ATTEST
H\ DIXON HINOLEY

Dftputy Clerk

-5-

CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a true and correct

copy

of

the

foregoing

Judgment

and

Order

to

the

offices

of the following counsel this 20th day of June, 1984:
Jerome H.
Arthur H.
Attorneys
356 South
Salt Lake

Mooney, Esq.
Strong, Esq.
for Plaintiffs
300 East
City, UT 84111

Spencer E. Austin, Esq.
Attorney at Law
185 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

I hereby certify

that on June

20, 1984, I personally

delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment
Order to the offices of the following counsel:

David J. Knowlton, Esq.
Attorney at Law
2910 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84402
Duane A. Burnett, Esq.
710 West 2125 South
Woods Cross, Utah 84087

hand
and
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,. gtion. Rule 19(a) instructs the trial
rt to join as a party a person whose
00
nCe will prevent complete relief among
\o& *k**dy parties. A plain reading of
a led 17(a) and 19(a) reveals that the trial
art should make every effort to insure
^it the proceeding adjudicates the rights
/ those necessary and intended to be be/ fe the court In conjunction with this
u^ic concept is the requirement in Utah
o O-P- 15W which states that leave shall
. f ^ y given to amend a pleading when
\j5tice so requires. This admonition is givn in the sentence which declares that subsequent amendments to pleadings may be
m*de only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party.
[2] Defendant cannot claim that it was
not aware of plaintiffs status as a partnership as early as nine months prior to the
oral. During the taking of depositions in
August of 1983, defendant's counsel was
informed that plaintiff was a partnership.
Plaintiffs status was also revealed to defendant both by the Stipulation and Order
to Amend mailed to counsel and at the
pre-trial settlement conference.1
The issue of dismissing an action with
prejudice was recently addressed by the
Utah Supreme Court in Bonneville Tower
a Thompson Michie Assoc, 728 P.2d 1017
(Utah 1986). The trial court's dismissal for
fiilure to join indispensable parties was
affirmed but the Supreme Court remanded
with the instruction to enter the dismissal
without prejudice. That Court wrote:
While the court below properly exercised
its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs action for failing to comply with Rule 19(a),
it was improper to do so with prejudice.
Dismissal with prejudice under Rule
4Kb) is a harsh and permanent remedy
when it precludes a presentation of a
plaintiffs claims on their merits. Our
rotes of procedure are intended to encourage the adjudication of disputes on
&eir merits.

for the court to dismiss with prejudice
and prevent future consideration of the
claims should the defect be corrected.
The trial court abused its discretion by
entering its Rule 41(b) dismissal with
prejudice.
Id at 1020.
[3] In this case we believe the court
abused its discretion in not allowing the
amendment or granting a continuance.
Defendant claimed no surprise, nor could
it, but instead relied on the specter of increased costs and complexity if the amendment was granted. Despite the parties being represented by the same counsel
throughout the proceedings and despite
there being no surprise, the dismissal with
prejudice was granted. While courts are
given great latitude and discretion in the
application of the law, they still must have
sufficient grounds to apply the "harsh and
permanent remedy" of a dismissal with
prejudice. No such grounds appear here.
The dismissal with prejudice and the
judgment are reversed and the case is remanded for trial.
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.
(Q

f «Y*U*MISYJUH>

DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah
corporation, and Dakal, Inc., a Utah
corporation. Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, et al.. Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 860287-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
July 22t 1987.

Not having considered the merits of
plaintiffs claims, there was no reason

Action was brought to quiet title to
property. The District Court, Salt Lake

cceiv^ , 1 " * 1 , c o u n s e l f° r defendant admitted re*ng the request to stipulate to the filing of

the Second Amended Complaint but stated that
he was unwilling to so stipulate.
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County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., quieted
title in subsequent purchasers subject to
equitable lien in favor of holder of trust
deed. Appeal was taken. The Court of
Appeals, Orme, J., held that unrecorded
conveyance was void as against subsequent
purchasers.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
1. Vendor and Purchaser «=»229<2)
For unrecorded conveyance to be void
as against any subsequent purchaser in
good faith and for valuable consideration,
subsequent purchaser must show he had no
actual notice, i.e., no personal knowledge of
prior conveyance or that prior conveyance
did not impart constructive notice or that
prior conveyance was not recorded before
his conveyance in same land was recorded.
U.OA.1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3.
2. Vendor and Purchaser <&»229<2)
If a subsequent purchaser has information or facts which would put prudent
person upon inquiry which, if pursued,
would lead to actual knowledge as to state
of title, unrecorded conveyance is not void
as against subsequent purchaser. U.C.A.
1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3.
3. Vendor and Purchaser «»229(2)
Unrecorded conveyance was void as
against subsequent purchasers, although
mortgage broker and principal of subsequent purchasers had sufficient information to necessitate further inquiry on status
of trust deed; broker and principal acted
with sufficient diligence to meet duty imposed by doctrine of inquiry notice by having title search performed and personally
contacting trust deed holder which mistakenly stated that loan was paid off. U.C.A.
1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3.
Jerome H. Mooney, Arthur M. Strong,
Mooney & Smith, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Ted Boyer, H. Mifflin Williams III,
Clyde, Pratt, Gibbs & Cahoon, Salt Lake
City, for defendant and respondent

Before ORME, JACKSON and
BENCH, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Appellants Diversified Equities T
versified) and Dakal, Inc. (Dakal) b ^ ^
an action to quiet title to a duplex a^ l
in Salt Lake County. Respondent A ^
can Savings and Loan (American) ^T*
recorded security interest in the prmw *
which was released prior to the conveyj?
es to Diversified and Dakal. The lo
court quieted title in Dakal, subject to**
equitable lien in favor of American equal ^
the principal amount owing on the n
secured by American's previous trust deed
Dakal seeks reversal of the lower court
judgment and an order that Dakal ow*
the property in fee simple, free of an?
interest in American. Diversified, which
bought the property from Dakal, seeb r*
versal of the judgment below and an order
upholding its rights against Dakal in the
property. We reverse.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
So far as is relevant for this appeal,
which concerns only the rights of Dakal/ Diversified and American inter sty the
dispute was submitted to the lower court
on a detailed stipulation of facts read into
the record by counsel. Although there are
several transactions, the key facts are relatively simple.
On January 2, 1978, American loaned the
Baileys $59,200, which was secured by i
trust deed to the property in question. The
trust deed was recorded in February 1978.
The property was then sold in 1980 u>
Liston, then on May 14, 1982 by Listen to
M & W Enterprises. Although M 4 W did
not pay cash, Liston parted with title to the
property. M & W's future obligations
were not secured by the subject proper?
but instead Liston was given a trust deeo
in other property, which proved to be
worthless as security. M & W sold the
subject property to Rydalch on May »
1982, as the first part of a contempt*
exchange transaction. The property **
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abject to American's original trust American's trust deed had been satisfied.
IS
to Rydalch
so recited,
as ~ Pentelute
was furnished a copy of the re^*Z*A
a n cand
U the
* deed
'• ~
"•
'" '
'
fc*^
•-.,« closing
Mnsincr papers.
Daners.
conveyance. Pentelute then contacted
various
order to purchase the property from Wayne Peck, a principal in both Dakal and
& W, Ry dalch borrowed $18,000 from Diversified, who agreed to purchase the
property.
. . . Pentelute ordered a title search,
r who took in return a note for $19,6
M & W's principal, Miller, promised which disclosed nothing unexpected except
oay Holzer within 30 days. Instead, a lis pendens recorded in September 1982
wller skipped town. Rydalch then at- on behalf of Liston. To facilitate the sale
oted to sell the property to raise the which would raise his repayment, on Janu* ey to repay the note to Holzer and had ary 21, 1983, Holzer obtained a release of
^attorney, Burnett, investigate the liens the lis pendens, albeit with a bad check,
the property. Burnett learned from an- and the sale from Rydalch to Dakal was
other financial institution that its trust closed later that day.
JLj of record had actually been disDakal paid $38,260 for the property and
charged and he secured a reconveyance. paid Pentelute a $14,000 finder's fee. Dakgydalch and Burnett then called American a j immediately recorded its warranty deed
t total of three times and, while the first an d so id the property to Diversified for
call was inconclusive, were told each of the $60,000. A month later American, having
other times that the loan to the Baileys had discovered its mistake, recorded an affidabeen repaid. Rydalch apparently chose not vit stating that it had released the trust
deed in error and that the trust deed was
w be too curious about who his benefactor
might be.
still in effect.
Prompted by the telephone calls, AmeriOn these facts,2 the trial court held that
can executed and recorded a reconveyance Diversified and Dakal were not bona fide
in early December 1982. American subse- purchasers of the property. It concluded
quently discovered that the loan had not that Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had
been paid and that there was a balance due more than sufficient information to necessiin excess of $55,000. Apparently American tate yet further inquiry into whether Ryerred because the Baileys had some thirty- dalch or any one else had actually satisfied
four loans with American, and American's the obligation to American and whether
records were somewhat confused. The tri- American had made a mistake in releasing
ll court concluded that American was neg- its trust deed on the property. The trial
ligent in reconveying the property.1
court cited the following facts as imposing
Meanwhile, Holzer began threatening upon Pentelute and Peck a duty of further
Rydalch that he and his family would sus- inquiry: the reference to American's lien in
tain bodily harm if the amount due him was Rydalch's deed; the sale of the property by
not paid. Although Holzer had received a Rydalch to Dakal for approximately onetrust deed to the duplex property, he want- half or less of its market value; the $14,ed cash. Rydalch then responded to an ad 000 finder's fee paid to Pentelute compared
placed by Pentelute, a self-described mort- to the purchase price of some $38,000; and
age broker specializing in distressed the same-day transfer of the property from
*ies. Pentelute spoke to Rydalch, Ry- Dakal to Diversified. The trial court quidaich's attorney Burnett, and American, eted title in Dakal, subject to an equitable
*«d received confirmation all around that lien in favor of American.
I- The reconveyance gives every appearance of
<*«»* the product of a deliberate—and deliberaH T " " * ^ " " * "V?11 Keco™*y*accn was signed
*Y one officer and attested by another. It recitedihat written instructions l o r c c
had
°«n received from the beneficiary and tkat »knote secured by the trust deed had been orient
«d for endorsement. It additionally recited th

the reconveyance was executed by authority of a
resolution of American's board of directors.
2. Significantly, the stipulated facts include nothing inconsistent with the conclusion that the
dealings of Rydalch and Dakal, through the broker Pentelute. were at arm's length.
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The issue on appeal is whether there was
sufficient notice of a "lien" on the property
to require a duty of further inquiry by
DakaL If there was, Dakal was not a bona
fide purchaser and took the property subject to American's "lien." 3
NOTICE REQUIREMENT
[1] Under our recording statute, an
unrecorded conveyance is "void as against
any subsequent purchaser in good faith
and for valuable consideration of the same
real estate . . . where his own conveyance
shall be first duly recorded." Utah Code
Ann. § 57-3-3 (1986). However, under
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), unrecorded documents affecting real property are
enforceable as against persons with "actual
notice." Thus, "[a] subsequent purchaser
must . . . show that he had no actual notice,
i.e., no personal knowledge, of a prior conveyance or that the prior conveyance did
not impart constructive notice, i.e., was not
recorded before his conveyance in the same
land was recorded." Utah Farm Prod
Credit Ass'n. v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d
904, 906 n. 2 (Utah 1987). Wayne Peck and
Pentelute obviously did not have constructive or record notice because American had
mistakenly released its trust deed and recorded its reconveyance before they dealt
with the property.
[2] As for the "actual notice" exception
of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), the
stipulated facts make clear Peck and Pentelute did not have actual knowledge of
American's interest However, the exception is also triggered if a party dealing with
the land has information or facts which
would put a prudent person upon an inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as to the state of the title.
Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah
3.

For purposes of this appeal, we employ the
parties' logic that the legal effect of an improvidently recorded reconveyance is to leave the
lien created by the trust deed in legal existence,
albeit unrecorded. We are not asked to decide
whether reconveyance has the legal effect of
actually terminating the lien created by a trust
deed and rendering the accompanying note, if it
has not been repaid, unsecured.

1983). Whether a party should be ch
with "actual notice," either in the sen ^
having actual knowledge or bein? 0 °*
quiry notice, turns on questions of f ^
See id. The trial court "found" that P ^
and Pentelute were chargeable with "aal notice."
' * tu "
EFFECT OF STIPULATED PACTS
Generally, a trial court's findings of f
are accorded great deference. Howev
without regard to the labels used, wh
those "findings" proceed from stipulate
facts, as in the instant case, the "finding"
are tantamount to conclusions of law, with
the stipulation of facts being the functional
equivalent of true findings of fact See
Stiles v. Brown, 380 So.2d 792, 794 (Ala
1980). See also City of Spencer t> Haw^
eye Security Ins. Co., 216 N.W.2d 406,408
(Iowa 1974) ("Where the facts are not in
material dispute, interpretation placed
thereon by trial court becomes a question
of law which is not conclusive on appeal.");
Schroeder v. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744
(Mo. 1979) (only issue on appeal was whether trial court drew the proper legal conchisions from the stipulated facts). On appeal, this court reviews conclusions of law
for legal correctness. Copper State Thrift
& Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah
App.1987). See Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
CONCLUSION
[3] After a careful review of the stipulated facts, we cannot agree with the lower
court's conclusion of law that Pentelute
and Peck (as opposed to Rydalch, who
clearly knew better) had sufficient information to necessitate further inquiry into the
status of American's trust deed.4
4. The previously identified specific faicton relied on by the court in support of its conclusion
that Pentelute and Peck were not bona fide
purchasers do not tilt toward that result. Refer*
ence in Rydalch's deed to American's, interest
was meaningless in the face of American's suosequent reconveyance. A distress sale well below market price can be prompted by numerous
factors. Indeed, it was stated in the stipuiiuon
of facts that Rydalch would testify he agreed w
sell so cheaply because he could not secure *
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While the circumstances were suspicious
and called for inquiry, Pentelute, acting for
peck, inquired—and with sufficient diligence to meet the duty imposed by the
doctrine of inquiry notice. He had a title
search performed and he personally contacted American even though the results of
Rydalch's and Burnett's three prior contacts were accurately—if disingenuously—
communicated to him and even though he
had a copy of the reconveyance. American
confirmed what the title search, the reconveyance, Burnett, and Rydalch all told him.
Wayne Peck, acting for Dakal and Diversified, reasonably relied on the title search
and the clear evidence, both documentary
and verbal, of American's reconveyance.5
American negligently released its trust
deed, and its security interest will not be
preserved against bona fide third party
purchasers who, at least on the facts as
loan since the duplex was not owner-occupied
and because of the lis pendens against the property. In addition, it was actually stipulated that
Rydalch was under extreme pressure because of
Holzer's threats of violence and because of the
imminency of a trustee's sale noticed by Holzer.
A hefty finder's fee is to be expected where a
free-lance broker finds a property which can be
had for a comparative song, A same-day transfer from one related entity to another might be
effected for a number of tax or business reasons. In this case. Diversified was a group of
investors put together by Peck but who. unlike
Peck, apparently had no interest in Dakal. The
back-to-back sales left the Diversified shareholders with a property worth more than they had to
pay for it, while netting Dakal. in which Peck
apparently had a greater interest, S8.000.00
profit.
5. A duty of inquiry requires the party to make
inquiry and to diligently do that which the an-

stipulated, were bona fide purchasers without notice and without further duty to inquire., To hold otherwise would defeat the
purpose of the recording statutes and subvert the sound commercial policy they promote.
We reverse and remand with instructions
to quiet title to Dakal and/or Diversified,
as their interests may appear, as against
American. Each party shall bear its own
costs of appeal.
JACKSON and BENCH, JJ., concur.
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swer to the inquiry reasonably prompts. Pentelute's inquiry elicited an answer which was consistent with the reconveyance document he had
seen, the title report, and Rydalch's and Burnett's reports about what they were told. It
would stretch the notion of inquiry notice beyond the breaking point to hold that the answer
Pentelute received to his inquiry of American
should have prompted him to go further. What
would he have done? Demand to see receipts,
instructions for reconveyance from the beneficiary to the trustee, or the chairman of American's board? He obviously had some concern
or, with a reconveyance regular on its face in
hand, there would be no reason to call American for verbal confirmation of the fact of reconveyance. But a duty to inquire is not a duty to
disbelieve, aggressively investigate, and set
straight. See also Note 1. supra.

